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Abstract—We  provide  various  results  about  the  transmission 
capacity  of  quantum  networks.  Our  primary  focus  is  on 
algorithmic methods to efficiently compute upper-bounds to the 
traffic  that  the  network  can  handle  at  most,  and  to  compute 
lower-bounds on the likelihood that a customer has to wait for 
service  due  to  network  congestion.  This  establishes  analogous 
assertions  as  derived  from  Erlang  B  or  Erlang  C  models  for 
standard  telecommunications.  Our  proposed  methods,  while 
specifically designed for quantum networks, do neither hinge on 
a  particular  quantum  key  distribution  technology  nor  on  any 
particular routing scheme. We demonstrate the feasibility of our 
approach  using  a  worked  example.  Moreover,  we  explicitly 
consider  two  different  architectures  for  quantum  key 
management,  one  of  which  employs  individual  key-buffers  for 
each relay connection, the other using a shared key-buffer for 
every transmission. We devise specific methods for analyzing the 
network  performance  depending  on  the  chosen  key-buffer 
architecture, and our experiments  led to quite different results 
for the two variants. 
Keywords-Quantum  network;  Quantum  cryptography;  network 
transmission capacity;  queuing network;  system security. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
It  took  about  two  decades  ever  since  quantum  key 
distribution  (QKD)  has  been  proposed  by  [1]  (the  famous 
BB84 protocol) until the first experimental implementations of 
a quantum network were presented by the DARPA [2] and the 
European  Union  [3].  While  the  theory  behind  secure  key-
delivery between Alice and Bob is well-understood (see e.g. [4] 
for  a  proof  regarding  the  security  of  BB84),  the  theory  of 
network design and performance analysis has apparently seen 
rather limited attention over the last years. The works of [5] 
and  [6]  both  considered  the  design  of  a  network  from  the 
topological point of view, and in terms of optimal security and 
performance. In this work, we go the other way, asking for the 
best  performance  that  we  can  get  from  a  given  quantum 
network  infrastructure.  In  particular,  we  provide  algorithmic 
means to answer two questions: 
1.  What is the maximal transmission capacity achievable 
in the network (using any classical routing scheme)? 
2.  What is the likelihood of local congestion that would 
temporarily  disconnect  the  (logical)  channel  between 
any two peers in the network? 
The  second  question  can  be  rephrased  into  asking  how 
likely  a  customer  is  to  wait  when  asking  the  network  for  a 
secure delivery of payload from one point to another. 
Our results are hence related to the field of communication 
theory, channel capacity and network coding. Particularly the 
latter  has  led  to  valuable  insights  (cf.  e.g.  [7],  [8],  [9]) 
regarding the rate at which information can be send through the 
network.  Contrary  to  these  (and  many  other  related) 
approaches, we do not employ classical information theory to 
quantify the capacity, but rather work with the directly known 
performances of each link in the network. Similar to our work, 
network outage probabilities are as well discussed in [10], [11], 
[12] and [13], where most research effort, as it seems, has been 
put on wireless networks. So far, the problem appears hardly 
considered in (hard-wired) networks or quantum networks. In 
the quantum computing domain, the work of [14], [15], [16] 
and  [17]  is  closely  related.  Contrary  to  ours,  however,  it 
strongly relies on quantum techniques and is less focused on 
algorithmic  methods  to  analyze  a  given  infrastructure.  The 
work  of  [16]  is  particularly  interesting  as  it  employs 
percolation  theory  (which  is  rarely  used  in  the  related 
literature).  The  problem  is  studied  elsewhere  in  [18],  which 
comes  up  with  proposals  on  how  to  enhance  the  existing 
capabilities once they are known. Here, we work out the limits 
similarly to the Erlang B and Erlang C models, so as to be able 
to improve them based on this related research. In the wireless 
domain,  the  interesting  work  of  [19]  deals  with  spread-
spectrum  techniques  and  uses  Poissonian  processes  for 
determination of the network capacity, but is specific for this 
particular  encoding  technique.  We  explicitly  avoid  such 
restrictions here, but adopt some assumptions on the quantum 
key-management models (following the proposals of [20]; cf. 
also [21] for another discussion related to quantum key- and 
network-management). Finally, we mention the work of [22], 
who  attempts  to  solve  the  problem  of  end-to-end  quantum 
communication using a three-party protocol. This architecture 
is  essentially  different  from  what  has  been  implemented 
nowadays, and thus subject of future considerations. 
Among the sales arguments for quantum key distribution is 
its  capability  of  running  over  existing  fibre-optic  lines.  This 
claim  has  been  substantiated  in  the  demonstration  of  the 
SECOQC- and DARPA-Networks [2], [3]. Hence it is fair to 
assume that the topology of the network is fixed and that the 
individual key-generation rates on each link are known (cf. [3] 
for  examples).  Moreover,  following  the  so-far  proposed 
architectures of relay devices in a quantum network (see [2], 
[3],and [20]), it is reasonable to consider a quantum network as 
a system of interconnected buffers, where the secret message is 
repeatedly decrypted and re-encrypted before forwarding it to 
the next hop. The key-buffers in each relay node are constantly 
refilled by QKD protocols running in the background 24/7 and (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
Vol. 2, No. 11, 2011 
10 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
 
Figure 2 Network with link performances 
 
Figure 1 Trusted relay with re-encryption in each hop 
endlessly  generating  key-material  for  later  usage.  This 
transmission regime, in its simplest form, is known as trusted 
relay, and is widely used in nowadays demonstration networks 
(cf. [2] and [3]). A transmission of a message   from Alice to 
Bob  along  a  sequence  of  nodes  that  share  keys         is 
displayed in Figure 1. 
Organization of this work: in Section II, we describe the 
graph-  and  queuing  model  (Section  II.A)  used  to  analyze  a 
quantum  network.  In  particular,  we  will  use  maximal  flows 
(briefly introduced in Section II.B) to compute bounds on the 
payload that the network can handle. Section III is divided into 
two  main  parts,  giving  algorithms  for  computing  end-to-end 
transmission capacity (Section III.A) and waiting probability if 
a chosen path through the network is blocked due to congestion 
(Section III.B). In both cases, we show how to use standard 
maximum  flow  and  shortest  path algorithms to  compute the 
desired quantities easily and efficiently from the known link 
capacities  in  the  underlying  graph  model.  The  process  is 
illustrated  by  an  example  (Section III.C),  before  conclusions 
follow in Section IV. 
II.  MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
We  will  not  burden  ourselves  with  the  details  of  any 
particular quantum key distribution (QKD) facility, but restrict 
our  attention  to  the  following  model  of  a  quantum  network 
(QNet):  let  a  QNet  be  modeled  as  an  undirected  graph    
      with adjacent nodes sharing secret keys thanks to QKD. 
That is, on any line       (with        ) maintain key-buffers 
on  either  side  to  store  QKD  key  material  for  subsequent 
transmissions. These key-buffers are nothing else than queues, 
in  which  key-bits  are  inserted  on  a  deterministic  basis  (we 
assume the QKD-devices to generate key-bits at constant rate). 
key-bits are used up on a random basis, depending on incoming 
payload  for  secret  transmission.  Based  on  this  view,  we  can 
cast the QNet into a standard queuing network. 
A.  Quantum Networks as Queuing Networks 
An open queuing network is a system in which a customer 
enters the network at some node, and moves onwards through 
the links, where he occasionally has to wait (queue) until he is 
served at the next node (i.e. he can enter the next node). Central 
questions in  queuing theory  regard the average  time to  wait 
until the customer reaches his destination point, or the average 
number of customers lining up in any given queue (link) in the 
network. For a quantum network, we can equally well set up 
such a model, based on the following correspondence: 
1.  incoming customers equal newly generated key-bits 
2.  leaving customers equal the (one-time) use of key-bits 
for Vernam-encryption of messages 
3.  a queue equals a key-buffer (storing bits for subsequent 
usage,  or  equivalently,  hosting  customers  for 
subsequent service) 
Observe  that  the  generation  of  key-bits  is  deterministic, 
while  the  arrival  of  messages  is  non-deterministic.  If  we 
consider the QNet as a backbone network, then it is reasonable 
to consider the event of an incoming message bit as a Poisson-
distributed  random  variable.  In  Kendall-notation,  the  link 
      in a QNet therefore is nothing else than a      -queue, 
disregarding  physical  size limits  of  the  key-buffers  for now. 
The graph   modeling the QNet thus constitutes a network of 
queues, and we are interested in its stationary distribution (so it 
exists). 
Remark: an alternative view yielding equivalent results is 
by associating incoming payload bits with customers, who get 
served  (encrypted)  based  on  how  much  key-material  is 
available in the buffer. In this case, we would have to think of 
the  message-queue  as  the  physical  incarnation  of  the  queue 
model  under  consideration. For  simplicity,  and  because real-
life  implementations  work  with  a  key-buffer  too,  we  shall 
consider the first of these two views, keeping the second view 
in mind whenever needed. 
Sufficient  conditions  for  the  existence  of  stationary 
distributions  in  queuing  networks  are  well-known,  such  as 
Jackson's  theorem  for  Jackson-networks  or  one  of  its 
generalizations, such as the BCMP-theorem. Openness of the 
network is assured, since the graph   is a mere transportation 
medium and messages necessarily leaving the network at some 
stage. Still, we cannot make any generally valid assertions on 
the routing algorithms implemented within the system. In lack 
of such information, we will try to find upper bounds to the 
transmission capacity by invoking maximum flow theory. This 
has  the  additional  advantage  of  our  results  applying  to 
conventional routing as well as network coding approaches for 
transmission. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
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Figure 3 Shared vs. individual key-buffers 
 
Figure 4 Forwarding with link-specific keys 
B.  Flows 
To illustrate the approach,  consider  the  example network 
topology shown in Figure 2. Assume that after start-up, all key-
buffers are empty and the QKD-protocol on link         start 
producing  key-material  at  constant  rate     per  time  unit.  It 
follows that after one unit of time, the maximal transmission 
capacity of the network is determined by the maximum       -
flow, constrained by the existing key-material on each link. As 
all links regenerate key-bits at constant rate, the minimum cut 
will not  change  over time.  Let       be  the minimum  edge 
cut,  then  the  maximum  flow  has  capacity          
∑     (     )    after the first unit of time. After   units, we have 
the  capacity           ∑         (     )                      The 
consumption of key-bits happens upon arrival of payload to be 
transmitted secretly from the sender   to the receiver  . Hence, 
we can consider the entire network as one large queue, whose 
internal  servicing  is  done  by  routing,  network  coding,  or 
otherwise.  From  outside,  we  have        as  the  deterministic 
rate at which key-bits arrive for later consumption, and we are 
back at the      -queue. Considering multiple access-points 
to the network is trivial by switching to a multi-source-multi-
sink flow. Unlike standard queueing disciplines, optimality in 
our  context  means  the  incoming  amount  of  key-material 
outweighing the arrival of messages, i.e. an "unstable" queue 
whose expected length is infinite 
C.  Key-Buffer Architectures 
It is easy to set up the devices so as to realize a single-path 
transmission as illustrated in Figure 1. However, it would not 
be reasonable to assume nodes to have only two ports, so the 
internal  management  of  quantum  keys  is  slightly  more 
involved.  Going  back  to  Figure  1,  we  can  instantly  fix  the 
problem of the message popping up in plaintext within each 
relay node by simply XOR-combining both, the incoming- and 
outgoing key into a single “relay-key” [20]. Figure 4 illustrates 
the idea: for the relay from node A to node B over node R, the 
latter would XOR-combine (-operation)    and    into    . 
Consequently, we would only store     in an individual buffer 
for this link (see Figure 3; right). If the relay is trusted, then it 
may alternatively decrypt the incoming message and re-encrypt 
it  before  passing  it  onwards  (as  shown  in  Figure  1). 
Consequently, we would have to maintain shared buffers for 
each I/O-port, as displayed in Figure 3 (left)  . 
 
 
III.  RESULTS 
We are now ready to present our main results. 
A.  End-to-End transmission capacity 
Given  the  (constant)  rate   of  key-bits  generated  on  link 
      , we can ask for the maximal average rate   of arriving 
messages that we are able to encrypt. Or stated differently: if 
we know the service rate, what is the highest rate of incoming 
customers  that  we  can  handle?  Obviously,  a  necessary 
condition is the rate of arriving customers not exceeding the 
service rate. This is almost sufficient, as the following result 
shows: 
Proposition 1.  Let a      -queue be given and denote the 
average arriving rate  by  .  For a  given  constant  service 
rate  , any arrival rate       leads to a stable system. 
So although the case       may be fine for a system with 
deterministic arrival, it is not appropriate for random systems. 
Proof: Denote by   the number of customers in the system 
and by                the probability of being in state  . In a 
stable situation, the total rate out of this state   equals the sum 
of  the  incoming  rates  from  states       and      ,  which 
yields for every      , 
                            . 
This recursive formula can be rewritten as 
       (
 
 
)
 
      
and since probabilities sum up to one we get 
    ∑  
 
   
  ∑(
 
 
)
 
    
 
   
  
This is simply a geometric series, which converges if and 
only if      , as stated.   
 
The above  proof  also  shows  that the probabilities    can  be 
calculated  via                  for  any         (by  using 
   
  
      where    
 
 . 
Putting  this  to  practice  within  a  quantum  network  is 
straightforward in two steps: 
1.  Upon  given  key-generation  rates  on  each  link,  use (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
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these rates as edge-weights in an undirected graph and 
determine a maximal flow from the source node to the 
sink node. Call the value of this flow  . 
2.  By  Proposition  1,  a  payload  of  up  to       bits  per 
time unit can be handled by the quantum network in a 
perfectly secure manner (assuming trusted relay). 
B.  Waiting probability 
Here,  we  need  to  distinguish  two  architectures  in  our 
theoretical  considerations:  let  a  node       be  given,  whose 
neighbors  are            eg    ,  where            denotes    ’s 
degree. Either each route passing through   is associated with 
its individual key-buffer (perhaps via logically partitioning the 
overall key-material somehow; cf. the right side of Figure 3), or 
all  incoming  and  outgoing  flow  draws  from  the  same  key-
buffer (Figure 3; left), in which case a very busy line can affect 
the capacities of other routes through  . However, short-term 
traffic  peaks  are  easier  to  handle  with  this  architecture.  We 
consider both variants separately. 
Individual key-buffers 
To estimate the probability that one has to wait to get the 
key-bits needed for encryption anywhere along its way from 
the  sender  to  the  receiver,  we  first  focus  on  the  waiting 
probability  in  one  particular  node  .  Observe  that  since  the 
key-buffers are not shared, distinct links from a node   to any 
of  its  neighbors  act  independently.  So  we  can  restrict  our 
considerations to any (arbitrary) key-buffer within  . Notice, 
however, that a link from   to its neighbor   has to be treated 
differently than the link from   to  , since we are concerned 
with forwarding packets. 
Let          be  any  node,  and  denote  its  neighbors  by 
     .  Pick  any  key-buffer  within     that  refers  to  the 
connection      , where         . Let the incoming traffic 
per  time  unit  on  the  route  from     to     be             
distributed, and assume the QKD protocol between   and   to 
reproduce an amount of   bits per time unit. Finally, assume 
the key-buffer to  be  full at the  beginning.  Let         be  a 
sequence of i.i.d. random variables                 where    
is the traffic at time unit  . The corresponding filling level of 
the key-buffer at time   can never exceed the capacity   and is 
thus given by 
 
         {                     ∑  
 
   
}   (1) 
assuming that we start off with the full key-buffer and re-fill it 
at rate   after the first time-unit (i.e. we do no refill within the 
first time-unit because the buffer is full already). 
We  are  interested  in  the  probability  for  the  link  being 
blocked, i.e. the likelihood of an empty key-buffer at time unit 
 . Hence, we ask for                                   . From 
     we  deduce    {                    ∑    
 
       }      if 
and only if                    ∑    
 
        . Hence, 
         {                 ∑    
 
   
    }  
    {∑   
 
   
               } 
If the traffic load over different time-units is independent, 
then ∑    
 
                      so  that  the  above  probability 
boils  down  to  a  mere  evaluation  of  the  Poisson  distribution 
function    |     ∑
  
       ⌈ ⌉  
     and comes to 
                            |        
It is legitimate to ask what happens if the refilling of the 
key-buffer  happens  on  a  random  basis  as  well.  Call   
  the 
amount  of  fresh  key-material  in  time-unit  .  We  can  easily 
replace the term             in (1) by ∑   
     
     so as to take this 
randomness into account,  but the  distribution  of     
      
  is 
no  longer  Poissonian  (mostly  because  the  difference  is  not 
bounded  from  below).  A  straightforward  way  out  of  this 
dilemma  is  considering  Gaussian  approximations  to  the 
Poissonian  densities,  which  takes  us  back  to  the  wonderful 
world  of  distributions  closed  under  convolution.  In  other 
words,  if  we  approximate                   by  
  ̃              the  above  derivation  and  result  becomes 
obvious.  We  leave  this  track  aside  here  and  go  back  to  the 
deterministic refilling, giving us the following result: 
Proposition 2.  Let            have  neighbors       ,  and 
consider the key-buffer shared with an arbitrary but fixed 
neighbor          of  .  Denote  by    the  size  of  the 
key-buffer associated with the link       and assume that 
new  key-bits  are  generated  at  a  constant  rate   .  The 
number of incoming message bits from   to   is assumed 
to  be             -distributed.  If        ,  then  the 
probability of waiting within   during a transmission is 
           or ar ing  rom   to   gets  elaye  
                      |    
      ∑
      
  
     
⌈          ⌉  
   
 
 
  where     
  
     
Proof: The argument is merely a matter of noticing that it 
takes a period of     
  
    time units to entirely empty the key-
buffer, if   bits are used up with   bits growing back per time 
unit (the time for encryption is considered negligible). Hence, 
the average expenditure is      .   (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
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Figure 5 Transformation of a node with individual key-buffers 
The alert reader might utter concerns about the stochastic 
independence  of  incoming  traffic  over  different  time-units. 
There are (at least) two ways to justify this assumption: 
  Considering the transmission  as a  process resting  on 
various routing  protocols,  we  can reasonably  assume 
the network's routing regime to rearrange, encode and 
decode,  and  to  partition  the  messages  in  a  way  that 
stochastic correlations between packets are negligible. 
Notice that this in no way rules out the possibility of 
linking packets to each other via sequence numbers or 
matching delivery addresses. However, this "weaker" 
type  of  correlation  does  not  necessarily  imply 
dependencies among the payloads of different packets, 
e.g.  when  a  long  sequence  of  independent 
cryptographic key-material is transmitted. 
  In case that the network is merely used for continuous 
shared  key  establishment  (in  fact, this is the  way  in 
which a quantum link is generally supposed to be used 
[3]), we can safely assume incoming traffic packets as 
stochastically  independent,  for  otherwise  we  would 
have  interdependence  among  key-bits.  This  is 
undesired  for  cryptographic  keys,  particularly  for 
quantum keys (as it reduces the key's entropy). 
  While Proposition 2 refers to only a single node, it is 
more  interesting  to  find  out  how  likely  a  blockage 
along a path from any node to any other node is. In the 
model  of  individual  key-buffers,  this  problem  boils 
down to identifying a path whose blockage probability 
is minimal.  We  can  simply  invoke  any  shortest-path 
algorithm for that matter, if we assume blockages to 
happen independently of each other. Consider a node 
         having neighbors     . 
Observe that Proposition 2 is concerned with the likelihood 
of  blockage  when  forwarding  a  message  from   onwards. 
Hence, we need to cast the undirected network model graph 
into a directed graph by converting an undirected edge into two 
directed edges (with opposite directions). 
Each link       for          maintains its own key-buffer 
with blocking probability       as given by Proposition 2. We 
transform  the  undirected  graph           into  a  weighted 
directed graph                such that 
1.  Each link              is carried over into two links 
                 with cost                    . 
2.  Each node          having  a number     |    | of 
neighbors  is  expanded  into  a  complete  graph  with   
nodes        , each of is connected by two directed 
edges in either direction. Each edge         is added to 
    with  the  cost                              
according to Proposition 2. The set of edges joining   
to its neighbors in  , i.e. the set {                }  
                         is  carried  over  to     as  
                                          with 
weights all zero. 
Figure 5 illustrates this transformation. 
On   ,  we  can  run  any  shortest-path  algorithm,  to 
determine  the  minimum  likelihood  of  blockage  using 
single-path routing. For any given sender   and receiver  , 
let their most reliable interconnecting path have "weight"   
in   . Then, regardless of the routing, we have 
   message  ill  e  lo ke                  
because   is the weight of the shortest path in   , i.e. the 
most reliable path in  . No matter what the routing actually 
does,  it  cannot  do  better  than  choosing  the  best  path 
possible, hence the value 
                   at least one no e is  lo ke   
is a lower-bound to the actual likelihood. 
Shared key-buffers 
In  the  case  of  shared  key-buffers  we  assume  the 
incoming  flows  from  different  nodes  to  be  independent. 
Then the distribution of the total flow trough          at 
time     follows  a  Poisson  distribution  with  parameter 
     ∑           , where    denotes the incoming traffic flow 
from  node   to  its  neighbor  .  Similarly,  all  neighboring 
links          contribute    bits  of  fresh  key-material  to 
the  common  key-buffer,  giving  a  total  refreshing  rate  of 
    ∑            .  With       we  can  invoke  proposition 
Proposition 2 again to calculate the probability of a node 
being blocked in this case. 
A little more care is to be taken when asking for the 
chance  of  blocking  somewhere  across  the  network  as  a 
whole. In this case, we use a transformation that is normally 
used to calculate maximal flows with vertex capacities. The 
transformation  from  the undirected  graph           (see 
Figure 6a for an example) to the directed weighted graph 
             is now specific for a sender   and receiver  , 
and proceeds as follows (cf. [23]): 
1.  Each  node    including    and    is  replaced  by  two 
nodes  in  out     , and a directed edge from  in to  out 
is placed to   . This link  in    out gets assigned the 
cost        ,  where     is  the  blocking  probability 
calculated as described above. 
2.  Each  undirected  edge           is  replaced  by  two 
directed  edges  out    in and  out    in.  See  Figure 
6b and Figure 6c for an illustration. 
3.  The nodes  in and  out are deleted, as well as all edges 
going into  in and out of  out. 
4.  Those nodes who remain to be assigned a cost receive 
zero cost. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 6d. (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
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Figure 7 Example network (link performances ? shown in kbit/sec) 
Once having found the shortest path in    between   and  , 
we can draw exactly the same conclusion as above: if   is the 
weight of this path in   , then the chance of this path being 
blocked for any path-based routing-scheme is lower-bounded 
by        . 
C.  Example 
To get a more intuitive understanding of the above results, 
we give a simple example. Consider a modified version of the 
graph from Figure 2, with six nodes but with neither an edge 
between vertices 2 and 3 nor between 2 and 4. We call node 0 
the sender and the receiver shall be node 5 (cf. Figure 7). We 
let   be 5000 kbits and choose the rates   (at which new key-
material is produced) randomly between 280 and 320 kbits and 
let  the  rate  of  the  incoming  message  bits  be           (see 
Table  1(a)),  where   is  a  positive  constant  (      in  this 
specific  example).  Under  this  setting,  we  get  the  average 
probabilities       shown  in  Table  1(a)  for  the  incident  of 
waiting  between   and    where  the  average  was taken  over 
          calculations. 
Using the transformation described above we get that the 
probability of getting stuck is lower bounded by 0.9137 in the 
case  of  individual  key-buffers  and  by  0.9929  in  the  case  of 
shared  key-buffers; again averaged  over         trials. This 
means that the individual link performances are indeed sharp 
bounds to the true bandwidth, as even slightly overshooting (by 
       kbit/sec  in  out  example)  makes  congestions  highly 
likely. If we just look at a single evaluation of the two different 
methods mentioned above, we also see that the paths yielding 
the minimal value may differ: while working with the design of 
individual buffers the algorithm takes route               in 
the  original  graph,  it  does  prefer               under  the 
shared buffer design. 
An  illustration  and  interpretation  of  Proposition  1  is  the 
following: with link performance values as given in Figure 7, a 
maximal  flow  is  found  at  607.54  kbit/sec.  So  this  is  the 
maximal traffic load that the network can handle. 
Better performance is obtained when we double the size of 
the key-buffer in each link. Under the same set up as before, 
but with        Mbit of key-buffer and the  -values as listed 
in Table 1(b), we get the blocking probabilities shown in the 
right  column  of  Table 1(b). The  blocking probability  for an 
end-to-end  communication  in  this  case  is            when 
individual key-buffers are used, and            when a shared 
buffer is employed. Finally, Proposition 1 tells that the overall 
end-to-end  traffic  from  0  to  5  is  bounded  above  by  608.52 
kbit/sec  (which  is  the  maximal  flow  under  the  respective 
capacities                 for each link). 
It  is important  to  observe  that  Proposition 2  explicitly  is 
concerned with situations in which the traffic load exceeds the 
key-(re-)generation  rate  on  the  links.  The  converse  case  in 
which there is a positive surplus of key-material produced on 
each  link is  obviously  not interesting in terms  of  congestion 
likelihoods (as the key-buffers cannot run empty in that case). 
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TABLE 1 BLOCKING PROBABILITIES EXAMPLES 
Edge ??   ?   ?  Traffic ? [kbit/s]  Blocking prob. ???? 
?   ?  305.23  0.7062 
?   ?  302.32  0.7058 
?   ?  304.70  0.7063 
?   ?  305.35  0.7067 
?   ?  305.77  0.7066 
?   ?  304.28  0.7064 
?   ?  305.65  0.7068 
?   ?  304.22  0.7064 
(a) Key-buffer size 𝑳   ? Mbit 
Edge ??   ?   ?  Traffic ? [kbit/s]  Blocking prob. ???? 
?   ?  306.06  0.6497 
?   ?  304.53  0.6493 
?   ?  304.29  0.6492 
?   ?  305.29  0.6495 
?   ?  305.89  0.6499 
?   ?  304.34  0.6494 
?   ?  305.65  0.6497 
?   ?  304.23  0.6493 
(b) Key-buffer size 𝑳   ?? Mbit 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Given  a  quantum  network,  we  have  shown  how  to 
efficiently compute bounds to the transmission capacity and the 
likelihood of blocked paths due to local congestions.  
A.  Future Work 
We focused on two specific architectures for key-buffers. 
Our approach and results are extensible towards more general 
ar hite tures (as  e  onsi ere  only t o “extreme”  ases here) 
for the key-buffers as well as for the relay-regime as such (cf. 
[22], who propose a novel three-party quantum communication 
approach). It is well known that classical routing regimes face 
difficulties  when  trying  to  attain  the  upper  bounds  to  the 
transmission  capacity  as  implied  by  the  max-flow  approach 
(network  coding  is  one  way  to  resolve  this  dilemma). 
Consequently, our bounds are not necessarily tight. A closer 
investigation  of this  is  subject  of  future  work.  Finally,  since 
quantum  networks  have  hardly  reached  a  level  of  maturity 
beyond  prototypes  or  lab  demonstrators,  reports  on 
comparisons of our results to other competing approaches are 
part of future research. 
B.  Summary 
Our analysis is entirely based on the physical topology of 
the network and the known key-generation rates on each link. 
In  this  work,  we  focused  on  single-path  (classical)  routing 
schemes, leaving analogous research in the field of multipath 
routing and network  coding  for  future  work.  Our results are 
easy  to  implement  with  off-the-shelf  algorithms,  hence  the 
proposed  analysis  technique  is  efficient  in  terms  of 
computational, modeling and implementation efforts. 
Despite  quantum  networks  not  having  evolved  beyond 
demonstrator  prototypes  yet,  the  possibility  of  setting  up  a 
high-security  transmission  network  over  existing  fibre-optic 
lines  is  quite  interesting.  Our  research  here  is  meant  as  a 
starting point towards the construction of such infrastructures 
in  an  effective  and  appealing  manner  for  the  potential 
customer. Quality of service and service level agreements in 
quantum networks,  unfortunately, have  by  now  not  seen the 
necessary attention to really bring the QKD technology to the 
market. Although ingenious solutions and brilliant theoretical 
achievements  have  been  made,  the  "last  mile"  between  lab 
implementation  and  large-scale  practical  business 
implementation needs more attention. 
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